


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~~Top Secret~~

CIA/SAVA / WIND 721104



WEEKLY VIETNAM INDICATORS

Week Ending November 4 1972

NSA Declassification/Release Instructions on File.

For the President Only

~~Top Secret~~








SOUTH VIETNAM WEEKLY INDICATORS

1968-1972


Weekly average for each month

AUGUST — NOVEMBER 1972


Weekly data as reported




US BATTLE DEATHS increased to 17 from the 3 of last week. This figure includes, in part, personnel killed in the shoot-down of a U.S. helicopter in MR 4.




SOUTH VIETNAMESE BATTLE DEATHS totaled 499 this week. This figure is preliminary and may change considerably as more complete information becomes available.




INFILTRATORS DETECTED IN PIPELINE include eight regular groups totaling 4,016 personnel. The estimate of infiltrators destined for South Vietnam and Cambodia since 1 October 1972 now stands at some 7,800 - 8,800.



ENEMY-INITIATED INCIDENTS decreased to 280 from the 346 of last week.



ENEMY KILLED IN ACTION rose from last week's 2,081 to 2,391.



SOUTH VIETNAMESE EFFECTIVENESS as measured by the percentage of enemy killed by GVN forces stood at 100% -- the same level as the previous week.

Statistics for the latest week shown are preliminary

FOR THE PRESIDENT ONLY

Enemy Activity

Enemy-initiated activity in South Vietnam was at relatively low levels last week, although the number and intensity of artillery attacks increased in the vicinity of Quang Tri City. The current tactics of the Communists continue to be designed to create the impression of a significant presence in as many parts of the country as possible. The Communists do not possess a capability to mount any sustained, large-scale offensive at this time, and multiple attacks by fire and small-scale ground attacks will probably continue to be their strategy until the situation on the negotiating front is clarified. In fact, the substantial enemy losses resulting from these efforts to display a Communist presence make it likely that the next few weeks will see a diminution of enemy-initiated activity, except in northern MR 1 where the enemy's supply and infiltration lines are short, and possibly in the Delta where some Communist units may have reserves which they have not yet thrown into the fighting.

The dismal military picture in Cambodia remained largely unchanged during the week, although the actual fighting was at a fairly low level. The Communists continued their efforts to disrupt the principal lines of communication and cut off Phnom Penh from the countryside and the seaport of Kompong Som. Some 35 miles northeast of Kompong Som, government forces reoccupied a position on Route 4 which had been seized by enemy forces on 1 November. The Communists still control a short section of Route 4 southwest of Kompong Speu, however, and they continue to carry out harassing attacks against FANK positions along the road. South of the capital, in Takeo Province, Khmer Communist elements still hold a five-mile section of Route 2 just north of the town of Chambak, and continue to harass FANK positions around Takeo City. Route 1 near Neak Luong remains subject to harassing fire from nearby commanding terrain, which Cambodian forces have, at least for the moment, given up attempting to win back. In the northwest, the Khmer Communists still control a short section of Route 5 between Kompong Chhnang City and Oudong, thus blocking access to the rice-producing areas of Battambang Province.

Government forces in northern Laos trying to recover lost territory north-east of Luang Prabang remain stalled some 10-12 miles from the town. On the Plaine des Jarres front, irregular units in the southern sector have again been forced to withdraw farther south, although units west and northeast of the Plaine are still maintaining their positions. In the central Panhandle, two irregular task forces are moving north to join other friendly forces at Dong Hene after recapturing and securing Kengkok. In the southern Panhandle, Lao Neutralist troops have reoccupied a mountain top overlooking Khong Sedone; and friendly forces are still operating around Saravane and Lao Ngam. Irregulars east of Pakse have met increased enemy probing and shelling activity.

Enemy Infiltration and Logistics

Recent evidence suggests that the dry season personnel infiltration push through Laos may be starting. In the first indication that large-scale movements of infiltration groups to areas other than the northern provinces of South Vietnam may be underway, seven groups destined for COSVN (Cambodia-southern South Vietnam) and another for the B-3 Front were detected in the Vinh area during the week. These groups, totaling roughly 4,000 personnel, raise the estimate of NVA infiltrators bound for the south since 1 October 1972 to some 7,800-8,800.

On the logistics front, the Communists are continuing to make unprecedented efforts to move supplies. Hanoi's import schedule for November calls for the highest level of deliveries since the mining of the ports -- some 220,000 tons of POL, agricultural goods, and unidentified products. This total is nearly 20 percent higher than the average monthly seaborne shipments of 186,000 tons in 1971. The planned POL imports for November show a 50 percent increase over the August

level, the most recent month for which we have a similarly detailed delivery plan. Agricultural imports are scheduled to be 21 percent above the planned level for August. During the first 25 days of October, over 7,000 tons of mixed ordnance, explosives, and POL were transshipped by logistics elements in the North Vietnamese Panhandle. [REDACTED] indicate that the major North Vietnamese logistics authority in Laos is realigning its way stations in such a way as to strengthen significantly its capabilities for moving materiel through the Laos infiltration system.

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